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Danish literary historian Georg Brandes put due emphasis on this issue in his 1888
Nietzsche lectures — whose topics were received with enthusiasm even by Nietzsche
himself — and he did so again in a 1889 essay on “Nietzsche’s aristocratic
radicalism.” In his correspondence with Nietzsche, Brandes identified psychology as
an especially effective and crucially important tool of philosophical investigation in
the Nietzschean oeuvre, and — with Nietzsche’s personal agreement — localized its
roots within a stimulating interdisciplinary and interartistic environment. In
particular, when Brandes portrayed Nietzsche’s personal psychological stance, he
foregrounded Nietzsche’s Dostoevsky interpretation and Ibsen, Strindberg and
Kierkegaard’s “psychological problems,” in addition to the influence of French
moralists and early psychologists. Thus, Brandes and Nietzsche explicitly referred
to several crucial psychological sources that Pippin does not even begin to touch
upon in his book.
The “psychologist Nietzsche” has been in the centre of interest ever since Nietzsche’s
days; in nearly every decade since can we find at least three or four works that are
relevant to the Nietzsche discourse at large and whose title includes ‘psychology’ or
some cognate concept. During the triumphant years of psychoanalysis this number
increased by several orders of magnitude. Among the great, “national” (i.e.,
German, French, North-American, Spanish, etc.) Nietzsche discourses that have
proved to be crucial for the whole of philosophical thinking, it is the North-
American Nietzsche discourse, e.g. that of Pippin’s, whose main pillar, Walter
Kaufman’s Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (1950) also presents the
Nietzschean oeuvre in explicit psychological context. This does not mean that it
would necessarily be difficult or impossible to say something novel and substantial
in this matter. Not even Pippin’s book can make us forget how modestly
contemporary philosophy utilizes psychology in the Nietzsche research, how scarcely
Nietzsche scholarship is exploited in contemporary psychology, and how difficult
contemporary forward-thinking representatives of psychology find it to deal with
Nietzsche. This is extremely unfortunate because Nietzsche discusses many issues
that should be addressed in the framework of contemporary psychology, a discourse
in which moral issues are constantly being “rediscovered.” Philosophers should also
take a larger share in building a bridge between philosophy and psychology.
Significant attempts to build this bridge, however, are yet to come, as is
unintentionally demonstrated by Pippin’s book.
Kristóf Fenyvesi
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Paweł Pieniążek. Sovereignty and Modernity: A Study in  the History of
Poststructuralist Reception of Nietzsche’s Thought. Łód: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2006. 517 pp.
Paweł Pieniążek is a distinguished Polish scholar. Beginning from the late 1980’s
when democracy had finally triumphed in Poland and opened the country to the
advanced theories discussed in the western humanities, it was Pieniążek who in a
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perennial cooperation with Bogdan Banasiak and Krzysztof Matuszewski from the
University in Lodz has made a colossal effort to introduce to Polish readers the
philosophy of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Pierre Klossowski, Georges Bataille
and Gilles Deleuze. By popularizing the major works of “French Theory” in a series
of highly valued translations, insightful commentaries and interpretations, along
with colleagues, Pieniążek has earned the much-deserved status of a pioneer and a
luminary of the Polish reception of poststructuralism and postmodernism.  
Pieniążek’s Sovereignty and Modernity: A Study in the History of Poststructuralist
Reception of Nietzsche’s Thought is his most extensive contribution to Nietzsche studies.
The book draws on almost a decade of work involving teaching, research and
publications, summing up the author’s investigations in French poststructuralist
Nietzsche’s reception.
The author’s point of departure and his working hypothesis do not seem
surprising. Following the general tendency, Pieniążek argues that Nietzsche’s
thought has been a major source of inspiration for French poststructuralism. The
main representatives of this current: Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille and Pierre
Klossowski, followed by the younger generationof thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze,
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, have worked out the key assumptions of their
conceptions in constant reference to the thoroughly read and personally lived
through oeuvre of Nietzsche. 
To each of the mentioned theorists Pieniążek devotes a chapter whose title
tellingly exposes the specificity and dynamics of the Nietzschean thought under
investigation: “Bataille: Between the Immediate Experience and Transgression
—The Esctatic and Mystical Nietzsche”; “Klossowski: The Mysticism of
Simulacrum — The Gnostic Nietzsche”; “Blanchot: The Ascesis of Transgression
— The Frenetic Nietzsche”; “Deleuze: From Ontology of Becoming to the
Philosophy of Difference — Nietzsche the Pluralist”; “Derrida: Transgression as
Deconstruction — The Textual Nietzsche.”  
Presenting this well-informed and perceptive study of Nietzsche’s influence on
poststructuralism, Pieniążek reveals more than promised in the introduction to the
book. He does not only discuss the selected conceptions in an extent that would
allow him to highlight the overwhelming presence of Nietzsche’s thought in them.
Instead, he produces a series of highly instructive mini-monographs of the French
philosophers, showing diachronically the development of their thought and
pinpointing the theoretical difficulties the philosophies in question faced at various
levels of their evolution. In this way we receive an exceptionally lucid book in which
“The Poststructuralist Nietzsche” is explained in depth in a way that simultaneously
provides many insights into the complex history of poststructuralism itself.  
However, it is not this merit that testifies to the greatest value of Pieniążek’s
endeavor. This value is for us to be seen in the “Conclusion” of the book which
reveals the author’s critical passion in developing and supporting his — hitherto
only vaguely signaled — conviction as to the necessity of salvaging Nietzsche from
the “claws” of the poststructuralist theory and essentially correcting the
philosopher’s much manipulated image. 
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This conviction is articulated in two mutually illuminating theses: the first one
states that the “failure” of Nietzsche’s oeuvre — interpreted in terms of his ultimate
inability to ground the new non-metaphysical and non-nihilistic conception of man
and culture — has been the condition for the rise of poststructuralism. Using
Nietzsche as a powerful ally, poststructuralism has argued for the impossibility of
introducing any form of socio-political order without resorting to ever new forms of
totalitarian violence hiding behind them the allegedly inevitable metaphysical
thinking. As a result of this disillusionment poststructuralism channels all its
intellectual potential into the decentering of the lifeworld in which it not only
refuses to build any form of stability, but wishes to destroy every unity, certainty
and order it encounters by exposing its totalitarianism.”   
The second thesis results from the first one and states that the poststructuralists
have largely ignored the original cultural thrust of Nietzsche’s thought. By drawing
from it a much limited body of ideas which, in addition, they have interpreted one-
sidedly and partially, they have failed to account for their ambivalent status in
Nietzsche and thus paradoxically “betrayed” their master thinker on various fronts.
By conscientiously effacing the normative dimension of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the
poststructuralists have revealed the tacitly nihilist — albeit hidden behind the veil
of declared anti-dogmatism, liberalism and egalitarianism — face of their
philosophies and proved that it is by no accident that the whole schema/formation
can be seen as locating itself in the very structure of modernity’s growng nihilism
which Nietzsche so desperately tried to overcome.
The final part of the book is different in tone. Every sentence seems to testify to
a crisis that Pieniążek has undergone in his struggle with Nietzsche and his
involvement in modernity. The author renounces the position of the historian of
philosophy and presents himself as a thinker deeply moved by the fate of the “genius
analyst” and “philosopher of culture”who in his effort to save culture from nihilism
has been misunderstood by his French successors. Moreover, according to Pieniążek,
Nietzsche could not evade the ambivalent logic of modernity in which the same
categories of its description may simultaneously reveal their creative and nihilist
aspect. It was on this ground of indeterminacy and undecidability that French
poststructuralism could have been born and harbored. The book’s conclusion makes
clear that it is its overt sympathy for those exact modern phenomena whose
ambivalence left Nietzsche’s thought in an impasse that makes of poststructuralism
quite an “un-Nietzchean” philosophy. The ambivalent phenomena in question are:
the total critique, skepticism, individualism, perspectivism, and pluralism.
Pieniążek convincingly argues that poststructuralists have expoited only the
“negative” side of Nietzsche’s work. The French thinkers found in it the conception
of philosophy as a total critique and endless demystification of metaphysical claims.
It is reminded that Nietzsche himself advocated the radicalization of critique
advancing the thesis on the binary-oppositional character of our thinking. On the
other hand, however, it was Nietzsche who anxiously observed the growing atrophy
of the creative powers of culture which in his later works he linked to the
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phenomenon of the dissolution of the absolute values waning under ruthless critique
leveled on them by the rampant criticism. 
Poststructuralism’s historical error consists according to Pieniążek in approving
the Nietzschean passion for critique without ever acknowledging the fact that for
Nietzsche, “to philosophize with a hammer” does not only mean to joyfully destroy
metaphysical idols, but to diagnose and intensively treat culture from its fateful loss
of center as well. The hammer needs to stop at one moment and the individual must
be able to finally say: “Here is my little island of sense and the truth that I believe
in. I do not want anyone to destroy it and so I will fight for it!” Here we follow
Pieniążek’s articulation of this particular problem.
It has become a question of a philosophical common place to see in Nietzsche the
patron of the poststructuralist idea of pluralism and perspectivism. The “anxiety of
totality” and an aversion to any form of a positive, stable resolution of e.g., a
dilemma or a controversy results in limitless criticism that undermines every
construction of sense and in multiplication of ever new perspectives which do not
compete with each other since they are restricted by the fear of the tyranny of the
“Right One.” Poststructuralism as interpreted by Pieniążek, does not wish to
differentiate between perspectives, interpretations and values, but levels the
differences and evades the necessity of creating hierarchies. The extreme example of
such a position is to be found in Derrida’s game of undecidability. Which of the
poststructuralist readers of Nietzsche would dare to argue about values? — one is
led to ask. Conversely, in Nietzsche the acceptance of the “plurality” of truths,
opinions and perspectives has never implied a relativistic position on the question of
sawhich of them and why one is bound to choose. For Pieniążek, it is essential to
remember that Nietzsche did distinguish between the soft and the strong type of
skepticism. By the same token, he sensed the difference between a weak and a
strong type of perspectivism. The strong, truly Nietzschean perspectivist will never
disavow his or her position, unlike the “weak” one who “tolerates” every
interpretation and welcomes their inconstancy as something inevitable and
essentially “good.”
Storey / On Lemm, Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy     179
Pieniążek challenges the interpretations produced in the circles of the enthusiasts
of the “Postmodern” or “Poststructuralist Nietzsche” and delegitimizes the
ambitious, albeit reduced image of Nietzsche as a prototype for deconstruction.
Pieniążek’s Sovereignty and Modernity is all the more interesting in that it comes from
an author genuinely fascinated with poststructuralism as a philosophy which has
largely managed to discredit the metaphysical tradition of European thought.
Writing his Nietzschean summa, Pieniążek has apparently settled accounts with
poststructuralism: the years of intensive reflection and new readings have brought
about the fall of the hitherto esteemed image of the philosophy in question as
Nietzsche’s legitimate successor and replaced it with a much more sophisticated,
complex and above all tragic vision. This new vision — well-documented with
precisely selected citations, filled with convincing arguments and elegantly written
— entices us to be more critical in our readings of Nietzsche and his
poststructuralist interpreters. Sovereignty and Modernity is a powerful objection to
construing Nietzsche as a patron of the skeptical, relativistic, liberal and egalitarian
tendencies of our contemporary culture. 
Michał Kruszelnicki
Wojciech Kruszelnicki
University of Lower Silesia, Wrocław, Polamd
Vanessa Lemm, Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics, and the
Animality of the Human Being, Fordham University Press: New York, 2009; ix-
xiv; 244 pp. Bibliography; index.
In Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy, Vanessa Lemm contends, contra Heidegger, that
Nietzsche’s unique understanding of the animal plays a pivotal role in his greater
philosophy and pervades his views on the tension between culture and civilization,
the play of memory and forgetfulness, the politics of domination, and the natures
of truth and historicity.  She insists that the key to grasping the relationship between
animality and humanity is culture.  For Nietzsche, culture consists not in humanity’s
conquest and transcendence of animality, but rather the resistance and return “of
and to” its animality.  Lemm argues that Nietzsche had a “biocentric” understanding
of life that navigates the extremes of biologism and anthropocentrism, where
biologism interprets culture as a means toward the end of species-preservation, and
anthropocentrism interprets culture as the mastery and conquest of animality.  Her
basic conclusion is that Nietzsche’s philosophy of the animal invites us to rethink the
traditional dichotomy between the human and the animal in a number of vital
contexts in order to resist forms of political domination and exploitation and
promote a healthier form of the philosophical life. 
In the first chapter, “Culture and Civilization,” Lemm introduces a conceptual
dyad foundational to her project:  culture and civilization.  For Nietzsche, the salient
sense of these terms hinges on their relation to animality.  He critiques civilization
because it “reflects a process of moral and rational improvement of the human being
which does not cultivate animal life but ‘extirpates’ and represses it” (4).  Where
